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Bioethics guidelines vary in their response to children as research subjects. Children have been 
ignored or intensely discussed, carefully protected or exposed to high risk research, regarded 
as the last or as the first group to take part in research. This article traces the changing position 
of children in successive bioethics guidelines.  
 
The guidelines are more clearly understood when seen against the background of social 
change and children's slowly developing human and legal rights.i There is a complex tension 
between children's right to protection or to autonomy.ii The child's status, as infant or young 
adult, is keenly debated around questions of an age of consent to health treatment and 
research. Anglo-American law recognises that `Every human being of adult years and sound 
mind has the right to determine what shall be done with his own body.' iii  Until recently 
obedience rather than autonomy has been expected of children. Yet their autonomy rights are 
changing in many countries from an emphasis on a stated age of consent to interest in individual 
ability.iv British health professionals are strongly advised: `the consent of the child and the 
parent or guardian should be obtained to treat children under age 16' (emphasis in original); it is 
preferable but not essential to involve parents; and `young people should be kept as fully 
informed as possible about their condition and treatment to enable them to exercise their 
rights'.v Doctors should decide when a child patient is competent to consent to treatment.vi The 
law on children's consent to medical research is still uncertain, so that the issue is much debated 
by research ethics committees.vii    
 
Modern bioethics guidelines began with the 1947 Nuremberg Code. Written mainly by lawyers, 
the Code starts by insisting: `1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely 
essential. This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; 
should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice ...'viii The risk-benefit 
assessment, the basis of consent, can only be made by the informed research subject, whose 
consent is `an understanding and enlightened decision'. Implicitly the Code deals with research 
on healthy adults not patients or children. `Benefit' is seen in relation to humanity and not the 
individual subject, and `death or disabling injury' must not be risked `except, perhaps in those 
experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as the subjects' (clause 5). 
Research is seen as a danger from which vulnerable people must be protected.  
 
British guidance in 1962-3 explicitly stated that `non-therapeutic research' could not be 
conducted on children because they are unable to give legally effective consent.ix However the 
report has completely different standards for research associated with treatment of patients 
which Nuremberg did not address. Like all subsequent guidance, the report was powerfully 
influenced by medical authors. It assumes that because of the `willingness on the part of the 
subject to be guided by the judgement of the medical attendant' if the doctor is satisfied that the 
procedure being researched will benefit the patient ` he may assume the patient's consent' as he 
would assume consent to `established practice'. This statement was not formally revised until 
1991. The red light shone on `non-therapeutic research' with children and the green light on all 
other research.   
 
Crucial Nuremberg standards were reversed by the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.x This followed 
publicity about thalidomide, the drug which, if taken by pregnant women, caused gross limb 
deformities in their babies. The research subjects' `freely given informed consent' is not 
mentioned until clause 9 and their ability to make `enlightened decisions' disappears. Instead, 
`the responsibility for the human subject must always rest with the medically qualified person 
and never rest on the subject'. Faith is reinvested in physicians dedicated `to help suffering 
humanity', who alone are fully qualified to make accurate risk-benefit assessments. It is 
assumed that physicians can therefore be trusted to research on children: ` when the subject is a 
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minor, permission from the responsible relative replaces that of the subject in accordance with 
national legislation' (clause 11). The phrase `therapeutic research' is not used, but the concept 
of `medical research in which the aim is essentially diagnostic or therapeutic' first appears in 
international guidance. Presenting research as a definite benefit instead of a potential danger 
plays a vital part in extending the range of permissible medical research on children. Helsinki 
recognised the interests of patient-subjects as well as of `healthy volunteers'. The 1983 version 
of Helsinki adds: `Whenever the minor child is in fact able to give a consent, the minor's consent 
must be obtained in addition to the consent of the minor's legal guardian.'  
 
Despite reservations about the term ` therapeutic research', in 1977 an American report used the 
term, and extended the types of permissible research on children. As if to reassure public 
opinion, risk was described in somewhat coy terms as `minimal', `minor increase over minimal' 
and `greater than minor increase over minimal'.xi  The report warned of the danger that 
restrictions on research might leave children as `therapeutic orphans', suffering disease for 
which no treatment could be developed. Discussion of children's mental and moral competence 
to consent was based on misleading, out-dated psychological theories,xii which unfortunately 
still dominate bioethics in 1990.xiii Intervening social changes, children's earlier physical and 
social maturity, and critiques of the theoriesxiv have been ignored. 
 
In 1980, British guidancexv stressed the benefits to children of research, and stated that 
`non-therapeutic research' would probably be accepted by lawyers, in the event of researchers 
being sued, as long as the hoped-for benefits exceeded the risks. A few examples of `negligible' 
risk were given, with some risk-benefit analyses which were later disputed.xvi Neither the 
assertion about likely legal judgements, nor the logical basis for the calculations was explained. 
The report stated that new procedures should first be tested `on adult volunteers, then on older 
children able to take part voluntarily in the research, and only then on younger children', except 
for conditions which affect only young children.  
 
In 1986, another British reportxvii advised that research should be more carefully regulated, with 
more stringent risk-benefit analysis. However, a prime concern was that ` research should not be 
against the interests of any individual child' (p234). This phrase lends moral respectability to 
much research which is precluded by the earlier requirement that taking part in research must 
be `in the best interests of the child'. Despite disagreement among the authors, and after listing 
some lethal interventions claimed by the researchers to be `therapeutic research',xviii the report 
used the term `therapeutic research'. It was defined as `research consisting in an activity which 
has also a therapeutic intention as well as a research intention towards the subjects' (p33). The 
consent of parents or guardians must be sought `at all ages of the child; furthermore the child's 
assent should be sought from the age of 7 upwards.' Assent is simple agreement or non-refusal 
in contrast to deliberated, informed consent(p235). The report continues: `On a cautious view of 
the law' with `therapeutic research', the parents' consent can `be deemed to override the refusal 
of assent by the child aged under 14'. `Non-therapeutic research should not be carried out if a 
potential child subject aged 7 to 14 years refuses assent to it'. The case for under-7s was not 
considered.  
 
Subsequent British reports have extended concern for children's views. Guidance in 1990 
emphasised consulting with children, explaining in terms they can understand, and always 
respecting the competent child's objection. If non-competent children object to `non-therapeutic 
research', `the investigator should reconsider whether it would be appropriate to proceed'.xix 
The prohibition that `research which could equally well be done on adults should never be done 
on children,' was repeated in other guidelinesxx including guidance from Brusselsxxi which 
stressed the importance of `informed, free, express and specific consent', and a report from the 
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Department of Health.xxii This report warned that `it would be unacceptable not to have the 
consent of the parents or guardian' even when children under 16 are competent to consent, and 
it is advisable to have parental consent for 16- to 18-year olds. If adults consent to any 
intervention which is not for the benefit of the child, especially if it carries more than negligible 
risk, ` it could be said they were acting illegally'. This cautious report was written by civil servants, 
anxious to prevent malpractice and costly litigation. The principle is often disregarded, as shown 
by research reports in medical journals, and some guidelines by medical authors. 
 
The 1962-3 Medical Research Council reportxxiii was updated in 1991,xxiv and advised that 
`either those included have given consent, or consent has been given on their behalf by a parent 
or guardian and those included do not object or appear to object in either words or action'. Also 
that, `when a child lacks sufficient understanding to consent, his willing cooperation should be 
sought.' The report speaks of ` allowing children to be included in medical research', as if this is a 
privilege for them. Some competent children want to take part in research. Yet the report avoids 
stating its purpose, to allow researchers to do research on children which was previously 
thought to be illegal. 
 
`Therapeutic research'.   
Much confusion between the interests of researchers and research subjects, and between the 
individual and collective interests of children stems from the term `therapeutic research'. 
`Therapeutic' is an oddly fuzzy, unscientific word; it expresses possibly unfounded hopes for the 
future as if they were present realities, it confuses the aim of research with the activity. The word 
offers a licence for researchers to claim good intentions. Yet scientific rigour would assess 
research in terms of outcome, effectiveness and efficiency.xxv One stringent view is that all 
medical interventions should be evaluated in order to reduce harm, rather than to claim to 
`therapeutic' status. Four proposed categories are interventions which: reduce poor outcomes; 
seem promising but are unproven; are used but the outcome is not known; should be 
abandoned in the light of available evidence.xxvi Phrases such as `the therapy might then do 
more harm than good'xxvii indicate that ` treatment' is a more accurate term than ` therapy' which, 
when it causes injury or death, is scarcely therapeutic. 
 
Research, meaning `systematic investigation', cannot directly benefit research subjects, 
although the treatment being researched may do so, and the eventual research findings may 
bring great future benefits. ` Therapeutic' can falsely imply that research confers certain benefit,q 
whereas uncertainty constitutes the very nature of research. Control groups who are having 
placebos or no treatment are sometimes mis-classified as ` taking part in therapeutic research'. If 
the benefits of a treatment such as a drug are agreed, then the drug is likely to be available as 
routine treatment; a child would not have to enter a trial in order to take it, and so research is not 
`therapeutic' in the sense of being the only access to the therapy. When approved drugs are 
used in research, the research question usually centres on their comparative efficacy. To claim 
that the actual research investigation, such as on comparative benefit, is `therapeutic' in 
benefitting people in the trial is not logical, since the results which may bring benefits are not yet 
known. Using the term `therapeutic' can confuse patients entered into trials, and imply denial of 
the uncertainty and equipoise essential for ethical research.xxviii A new drug being tested could 
not strictly be described as therapeutic until its benefits and risks are known. For these reasons, 
all research is in a sense `non-therapeutic'.   
The distinction between `therapeutic' research which is associated with treatment (as when a 
method of diagnosis or treatment is being tested), and `non-therapeutic' research not 
associated with treatment (such as observing average growth), is important as long as the 
misleading labels are avoided. The further distinction between research and the treatment being 
researched would then be clearer. Abolishing the term `therapeutic research' would help to 
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clarify which rare treatments are only available within research projects, and which treatments 
are still too new to be described responsibly as beneficial. Researchers would also see more 
clearly who is benefitting whom. As doctors they try to help their patients. As researchers 
collecting data they are helped by their patients; the beneficiary is the researcher who receives 
data, which may in future benefit the child donor and many other children, but this is not yet 
certain.  
    
Current confusion between research and treatment is illustrated by such statements as, when 
`therapeutic research' is proposed for children, `in circumstances where participation would be 
in their best interests their exclusion would be unethical'.xxix Maybe the findings will be of great 
benefit to these children, but no one can be certain at the `recruiting' stage about the results or, 
therefore, about whether taking part will prove to be in the child's interests. Some doctors argue 
that patients who take part in research have access to better treatment. Yet most guidelines 
stress that patients should be assured that this is not so; that they will continue to have the best 
possible care even if they refuse to take part, or withdraw from research. Some health services 
are supplemented by research funds; standards of professional care, meticulous evaluation, 
resources and support services are then likely to be better for patients in trials. Yet should 
discrepant standards be a source of concern about current care rather than being used to 
pressure people, however gently, to take part in research?   
 
`Risk' is often a vague understatement in `therapeutic research', covering known and 
unpredicted risks, harms, costs and inconvenience to research subjects. Although risk 
probability may be measured, risk severity is often a personal, variable assessment. Risk is a 
relative concept. For example, when a new treatment is tried on a healthy person the level of risk 
can seem very high; when the research subject is extremely ill and the treatment has a slight 
chance of helping, the same level of risk might seem very much lower in comparison. Yet the 
level is constant, and it could be argued that a healthy person is better able to withstand the risks 
than someone already debilitated and enduring the harms of severe illness.  
Research into treatment which might be highly beneficial, such as drugs or surgery intended to 
save life, is permitted to incur the highest risks, although the hoped-for benefit should always 
outweigh the degree of risk.xxx The requirement begs the question that harm and benefit are 
measurable and comparable. The distressing dilemmas facing very ill children and the adults 
caring for them, when `research' seems the last hope, might be relieved a little if the terms were 
clarified. The serious condition and the possible innovative and uncertain treatments could be 
considered. The many questions about research could then partly be separated from treatment 
considerations. The more ill the patient, the higher the justifiable risk is another questionable 
convention.xxxi Children's heart diseasexxxii illustrates the pressures which illness and fear of 
death exert on the families and the staff to resort to high risk innovations. Proxy consent 
presents the further problem that parents tend to feel forced to `try anything', and to consent to 
attempts on their child which they would refuse for themselves.xxxiii Do not very ill children need 
as much protection as `healthy volunteers'? 
 
`Gene therapy' 
In The Report on the Ethics of Gene Therapy,xxxiv research, experiment and innovation are 
soothingly subsumed under `therapy', further blurring distinctions between them. Some of the 
report's authors belong to a small group represented on almost every similar committee. Apart 
from the moral philosopher, everyone's qualifications in ethics seem uncertain, suggesting that 
`ethics' is a label for a variety of uncomfortable questions which need to be given reassuring 
answers that have the seal of public approval, and indeed the report bears the royal seal. The 
pragmatic report is about how to proceed, and says little about whether to proceed with gene 
modifications which might be thought a crucial prior ethical question. Yet this question is 
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dismissed: ` To prohibit the progress of science in any particular direction may well be tyranny; to 
seek to shape its course is surely sensible'(pii).  
 
Themes in the report illustrate how children are construed as beneficiaries of research, partly 
through an impersonal, abstract approach. A gene is defined as `an element of the genome 
which may be responsible for an inherited character difference. A sequence of bases in DNA 
which codes for one polypeptide.' Obviously an ethical analysis must be scientifically informed, 
but how much information is essential? The language of impersonal science cannot encompass 
people's pleasure or anguish about the abilities or disease which children inherit, and such 
matters are not addressed. Yet it is precisely in such human experiences that we exist as ethical 
beings. If we were the organisms discussed in the explanatory biology-speak, ethics would be 
irrelevant. The language risks translating genetics into a matter of function and manipulation 
instead of identity and relationship, thereby simplifying or obliterating the most complex ethical 
dilemmas. 
 
Genetics possibly represents the most sophisticated cultural efforts to alter human nature. What 
degree of intervention is socially acceptable and, in future, will be expected before affected 
children qualify as human beings? What intervention methods will be used, and accepted? The 
nature/culture confrontation is especially pertinent to babies and young children who occupy a 
questionable position between the human and animal, natural and cultural worlds, particularly 
as genetics has developed through animal and fetal research. The report only indirectly 
addresses such questions. No reason is given for the authors' priority: `The first ethical principle 
which has commanded our attention is the obligation inherent in human nature to enquire, to 
study, to pursue and apply research by ethical means'(p10). To claim such highly cultural 
pursuits as natural, as an obligation (to whom?), and as the first principle, suggests that anyone 
who disagrees is unnatural and unethical, closing rather than opening up this contentious area 
of debate. If human nature is reduced primarily to the intellect, the humanity of very young or 
mentally impaired children is in doubt.   
 
Problems of eugenic selection, and of stigma for those who cannot or will not undergo genetic 
interventions, xxxv  are not discussed in the report. As the government remit required, 
considerable problems associated with the profit and prestige promised by genetic research, 
and the devastating effects which diagnosis may have on affected people are side-stepped. 
These problems are mentioned, `we are sensitive to these issues', but `we are not charged with 
concern' for them. High current costs of attempting to relieve genetic symptoms are mentioned. 
Yet such statements mean little unless measured against the costs of genetic research, gene 
manipulation and its effects. 
 
The report lists uncertainties and dangers. The `correcting gene' might be inserted into the 
wrong cell type, inappropriately, in the wrong amount or at the wrong time during development. 
It might move into other genes, creating unwanted effects. Changes in one gene might 
inadvertently affect other genes, initiate cancerous growths or new genetic disease, or have 
other unknown longer-term effects. It is not `yet possible to lodge a gene precisely where it 
would naturally be.'  `The therapy might then do more harm than good' (p9). ` Nevertheless, this 
approach may well be effective in selected disorders'(p8). The report is liberally sprinkled with 
`may well', `unlikely' `may be feasible', and fears are dismissed. `There are likely to be irrational 
fears which derive from misunderstandings of biology, and are compounded by the effects of 
popular recreations of fiction such as Frankenstein's monster'.(p2) Rationality is thus identified 
with the hopes of fearless biologists.  
 
The report states that `gene therapy' `poses no new ethical challenges' and should `be 
conducted according to the discipline of research and governed by the exacting requirements 
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which already apply'.(p25) However, a new ethical challenge is made by advising that the first 
candidates will preferably be treated `in early childhood and even before birth' in utero. The 
statement reverses the Nuremberg precept, that research should be carried out on informed 
and consenting people in preference to weak and vulnerable ones, and on adults before 
children. Could not gene modification first be attempted on adults with degenerative disease 
which develops in adulthood? The choice is not necessarily easier when made by the adult 
concerned, yet it respects self-determination and allows for refusal far more than proxy consent 
can do. 
 
Until the technical problems of `gene therapy' are better resolved, and the short- to mid-term 
effects are known, should it be tried on children? Children have far more to gain, but also to lose, 
by being research subjects. An adult who enjoys a fulfilling life but who has nearly reached the 
onset of a terrible disease may decide to risk treatment and lose the later years of life. Mistakes 
with children can harm or destroy a whole lifetime. Some genetic defects destroy any kind of 
reasonable life almost from birth, although the child has to be well to qualify for treatment. Yet if 
harm-benefit equations are calculated on the basis that nothing could be worse than the 
disease, then any kind of treatment is permitted. Dreadful as the disease may be, the child's 
possibly brief and miserable existence can still potentially be made worse by attempts which `do 
more harm than good'. Genetic research is closely linked to innovations such as in vitro 
fertilisation. The `success rate' for IVF, of around ten per cent which includes disastrous live 
births,xxxvi suggests that very low `success rates' will also be tolerated for genetic interventions. 
 
A further reason for affording extra protection to children is given by the impressive pages on 
safeguards in the report. `A prior ethical requirement' is the subject's consent, with great care 
taken to provide `the fullest possible information', respect for confidentiality, and so on. This is 
reassuring when applied to adults, but means little in relation to young children whose particular 
vulnerabilities the report does not discuss. Their interests are also threatened by another British 
reportxxxvii which calls for `a radically different approach' to ethics which will set people's right to 
know their own (and therefore close relatives') genetic constitution over the right to privacy.  
 
Problems arise from confusing research with therapy, rigorous control of research with ` tyranny', 
the interests of adult researchers with those of child subjects, and safeguards for consenting 
adults with those for young children. In honouring intellectual discovery, the report disregards its 
costs in physical suffering, and the interests of young children whose intellectual status as full 
human beings is questionable. Then, very high risk research may be seen as more ethical when 
conducted on babies rather than on adults with dependents and careers. Until hoped-for 
benefits far more demonstrably outweigh the unknown and unhoped-for harms, the key 
questions are: Who has the right to consent to high risk innovations on young children? And 
according to what criteria should such decisions be made?  
 
Successive bioethics guidelines are like a series of doors, opening to involve children 
increasingly in research. Restrictive labels on the doors - `danger', `adults only', `in the child's 
best interests' - change to permissive ones - `therapeutic research', `allow children to be 
included', `not against the child's interests', `preferably in early childhood'. To involve children 
more fully in research obviously exposes them to greater benefits and risks. Protections for adult 
research subjects sometimes fail adults and are insufficient for certain children. Basic principles 
for research with children need to be more clearly agreed, and analyzed into their many 
component practical questions for researchers to address. We need to refine ways of informing 
and consulting with children, respecting their autonomy and their vulnerability. This could help to 
fulfil the guidance that `research involving children is important for the benefit of all children and 
should be supported and encouraged, and conducted in an ethical manner.'xxxviii 
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